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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
wherein the court, emphasizing the word "all," reasoned that the
condemnor should not be allowed to have appraisals made, discard
the highest, and submit the lowest.
Both the second and fourth department rules use the words
"intended to be used at the trial." When is an appraisal report
"intended to be used at the trial?" It logically follows from the
disposition made by the Inwood court that only appraisal reports
on file are "intended to be used at the trial." However, the
decision in Ives seems to indicate that the mere preparation
of an appraisal ipso facto makes it "intended to be used at the
trial." The Inwood court seems to have reached the better
result. An amendment to the fourth department's rule requiring
filing of appraisals should bring about the better result achieved
in Inwood.
ARTICLE 32- ACCELERATE JUDGMENT
CPLR 3212(e): Entry of partial summary judgment proper
despite outstanding counterclaims in excess of demands
in complaint.
CPLR 3212(e) permits a court to grant summary judgment
"as to one or more causes of action, or part thereof . . . on such
terms as may be just." The court is further authorized to sever
the cause of action in which summary judgment is granted from
any remaining cause of action.
1 22
In Dalminter v. Dahmine, 23 appellants contended that special
term erred in granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs,
since meritorious counterclaims in excess of the amounts in the
complaint and directly related thereto had not been tried.
The appellate division, first department, held that since the
counterclaims were not inseparable from plaintiffs' causes of action,
it was within the discretion of special term to enter partial
summary judgment under CPLR 3212(e) .224 However, the court
pointed out that the defendants were protected by a stay of
execution until the remaining issues were tried.
122 It is interesting to note that this provision is somewhat redundant
in light of CPLR 5012 which authorizes the court to order a severance
and direct judgment "upon a part of a cause of action or upon one or
more causes of action as to one or more parties." See 5 WEMs-N-,
KORN & MILLR, NEw Yom< CIvm PRAcnrcE l 501201 et seq. (1967).
12329 App. Div. 2d 852, 288 N.Y.S2d 110 (1st Dep't 1968).
14 It should be noted, however, that where there is but one cause of
action and one or more counterclaims which raise triable issues, it would
be improper to award summary judgment for an amount equal to or
greater than the prayer for relief, since there can be no severance. See
Illinois McGraw Elec. Co. v. Watters, Inc., 7 N.Y.2d 874, 164 N.E.2d
872, 196 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1959); Dietz v. Glynne, 221 App. Div. 329, 223
N.Y.S. 221 (2d Dep't 1927).
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